Hamas Leaders Assassinated: Terror Proxies’s Destiny To Fall?

On October 16, Israel successfully assassinated Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, just ten weeks after killing his predecessor, Ismail Haniyeh. Israel has seemingly dealt Hamas a mortal blow, putting them on the verge of an existential crisis.
However, this is not the first time that a lethal terror group has faced such a threat. The present situation recalls the history of the Black September Organization (BSO), a Palestinian militant organization that caused chaos in Jordan in the 1970s. With Israel’s recent assassinations, history may well repeat itself.
A little history is needed to understand where the BSO came from. The Third Arab-Israeli War in 1967 saw hundreds of thousands of people displaced from their homes, fleeing the fighting. Many Palestinians living in the West Bank region fled to Jordan. Israel continued to occupy the West Bank afterwards, leading to Palestinian fedayeen (guerilla fighters; a more literal meaning being “those willing to sacrifice themselves”) setting up a new base in Jordan and launching attacks against Israel from there.
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) gained further Arab support when Israel retaliated against the fedayeen strikes. Groups within the organization began calling for the toppling of the Jordanian monarchy. Eventually, after further disagreements and violent confrontations, King Hussein of Jordan decided to go on the offensive. This led to Black September, where the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) surrounded cities with significant PLO presence and attacked them. The latter half of September 1970, had the most concentration of fighting in the entire conflict.
In the end, leaders on both sides signed many ceasefires and agreements, but none were upheld in their entirety. The PLO and Palestinian people moved to Syria in droves. However, some fedayeen remained, angered by Jordan’s actions. They continued to fight back, but the JAF eventually drove the last of them out by July, 1971. A small group of men from Fatah, the biggest faction of the PLO at the time, formed the BSO in September, 1970. They rallied around Abu Ali Iyad, a commander who had remained in Jordan after the PLO withdrew. There was only one goal in mind: revenge against King Hussein and the JAF.
The BSO operated very differently to typical militant terrorist organizations of the time. John K. Cooley was a notable journalist of the period, specializing in Islamist terrorism. In his book, Green March, Black September, he stated that, “Black September represented a total break with the old operational and organizational methods of the fedayeen. Its members operated in ‘air-tight’ cells of four or more men and women. Each cell’s members were kept ignorant of other cells. Leadership was exercised from outside by intermediaries and ‘cut-offs’.”
By operating in this manner, every detail of their movements and the members of the organization itself could be kept secret. This drastic change in structure and operation showed a strong intent to succeed in their goals. Everything was on a need-to-know basis, with their leaders hidden. The BSO could easily cut off any cell that failed a mission and disassociate from any actions carried out, as could Fatah. One cell’s failure did not affect the rest. 
The BSO managed to carry out multiple, successful terrorist attacks across the globe. The most tragic was the 1972 Munich massacre, where the BSO murdered 11 Israeli Olympic athletes and one German police officer. The BSO planned and carried out assassinations, hijackings and bombings over the course of four years, from 1970 to 1973. Apart from the Munich massacre, these operations were covert, like the 1973 letter bombing incident. The BSO sent dozens of letter bombs from Amsterdam to various Israeli diplomatic places around the world. Many were intercepted on the way, but one managed to make its way to Ami Shachori, the agricultural counselor at the Israeli Embassy to the UK. He mistakenly believed it contained seeds he had ordered and the resulting blast fatally wounded him.
The BSO even managed to somewhat fulfill their original goal of revenge. They assassinated Wasfi Tal, the Jordanian prime minister at the time, for his role in the events of Black September. Aside from Jordan, Arab nations widely denounced Tal, as they had supported the Palestinian fedayeen. However, his loyalty to his king and country was rewarded with his popularity among the people. He was elected prime minister three times: in 1962, in 1965 and again in 1970.
After the Munich massacre, Israel’s Mossad launched a long, covert operation to assassinate key members of the BSO, known as “Wrath of God.” Mossad got to work quickly, taking out various senior BSO members and those involved in the Munich massacre specifically. Many of these operations happened between the events of Munich and September 1973. Mossad’s success and ruthlessness likely played a major factor in the PLO decision to shut down the BSO. The exact date is contested, with Israeli historian Benny Morris saying September 1973, and other sources claiming that it was December 1974. Either way, there was only one more attack BSO claimed to have carried out after 1973, which was the Antwerp synagogue bombing in 1981.
Mossad’s actions led to an existential crisis for the BSO. With senior members and leaders out of commission, being either dead or constantly in hiding, running the organization became exceedingly difficult. There were also disagreements internally on how to continue operations and what direction the BSO should go in. Furthermore, Fatah had begun to engage Israel in diplomacy, shifting away from the use of violence to further the Palestinian cause.
The dissolution of the BSO potentially occurred for three reasons. Firstly, the ideological fervor that drove the BSO, and possibly even Fatah, forward in the first place was running out. Secondly, anti-Zionist sentiment was weakening. Thirdly, Fatah and the BSO did not have the necessary resources to maintain an armed struggle.
While the existence of Israel was a thorn in the side of the Arab Middle East, it was clear that Israel would not fall easily. They survived attack after attack, held their ground and even claimed other countries’s territories at times. Israel was there to stay. The Middle Eastern countries were not united in their desires either. They often fought with each other as well, like how the PLO fought with Jordan and how the Lebanese civil war broke out. Terrorist attacks outside of the region surely didn’t please other countries as well, whose opinions may have changed from such events, leading to less interest in the Arab struggle.
Within the PLO, there were, and still are, many factions and opinions. General sentiment leaned away from continuing the armed struggle. It ate up their funds and only had limited success. It was not achieving what they had hoped. Given that the Palestinian people had no guaranteed home and no land to call their own anymore, resources were always limited. Mossad’s offensive operations against the BSO were also burning through Fatah’s and the BSO’s resources, as well as personnel. The BSO was practically backed into a corner.
Israel’s actions weren’t without its dissenters and mistakes however. While ruthless, the operations were more about revenge than trying to stop terrorism. Israeli author and journalist Aaron J. Klein quoted a Mossad senior intelligence source, saying, “Our blood was boiling. When there was information implicating someone, we didn’t inspect it with a magnifying glass.” Given that the BSO was shut down within a year or two of the Munich massacre, it shows Mossad’s effectiveness. But in terms of stopping terrorism entirely, it was a complete failure.
In December 1974, PLO chairman and Fatah leader Yasser Arafat called for his followers to cease violence outside of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242 and 338 in 1967 and 1973 respectively, which shows that the PLO had managed to bring the Palestinian plight to the attention of the West. Attacks continued through the 1970s, but once the Lebanese Civil War began in 1975, the PLO’s attention shifted. Given that they mostly operated out of southern Lebanon at the time, it’s no wonder. 
In time, those Resolutions led to the Oslo Accords, a pair of agreements signed by Israel and the PLO, in an attempt to bring about a long-lasting peace. One of the most important outcomes of the Accords was the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which is an elected body of representatives for the Palestinian people, allowing them some level of self-governance.
Unfortunately, this did not create the desired effect. A large number of Palestinian people and organizations vehemently opposed the Accords, with various terrorist attacks occurring afterwards in retaliation. Even some Israelis weren’t happy about it. A far-right Israeli extremist carried out an assassination on the Israeli prime minister at the time, Yitzhak Rabin, who was the one to sign the Accords.
In 1996, Palestine held its first general elections. Fatah dominated these elections, with their leader Arafat becoming President with 89.82% of the vote. He was incredibly popular at the time and the Palestinian people believed he would lead them to peace. However, the negotiations between Palestine and Israel never led to a true peace agreement. As the years went on, the Palestinian people grew weary. Their struggle was never ending and unchanging.
During this time, Hamas, the only other potential rival to Fatah, began to grow in popularity. Hamas had never agreed to the Oslo Accords and still continued to bombard Israel with attacks in any way they could. Disagreements between Fatah and Hamas caused continuous postponements of the elections. The passing of Arafat in 2004 left Fatah without its charismatic leader. Finally, in January 2006, Palestinian elections were held. Hamas won a majority of the seats, to the shock of the world. Most Western countries expected a re-election of Fatah. Hamas now controlled 74 of the 132 seats in the PNA. The two factions’s disagreements escalated, and they were unable to form a government that held together for the sake of the Palestinian people.
It only took until June 2007 for the tensions to come to a head. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas-affiliated and Fatah-affiliated forces came to blows. After a series of violent clashes, Hamas took full control of the Gaza Strip and that has been the situation up until now. Hamas controlled Gaza and the PNA controlled the West Bank.
On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched their largest attack ever against Israel, killing around 1,200 people and taking around 250 as hostages. Israeli forces mounted an aggressive counter-attack, announcing their intent to eradicate Hamas entirely. Since then, it’s been a war between the two. Allegedly, over 40,000 Palestinians have been killed in the fighting. Israel has also assassinated many Hamas leaders across the world, including the aforementioned Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar.
Hamas had clearly been preparing for the October 7 attacks for a long time. They built up their forces, their funds and their ammunition. What they didn’t seem prepared for though was the Israeli retaliation. While the war is still ongoing at the time of writing, Hamas is certainly not in a winning position. Their people are suffering and their leaders are dead. If Hamas even survives as an organization once Israel is done, it will be a miracle. But will the idea of armed struggle live on?
There are many parallels between Hamas and the BSO. Both were born of strong ideals and strong condemnation of their enemies. Their enemies retaliated ruthlessly as well. The BSO was shut down and Hamas looks to be on the same path. Hamas is not the only terror proxy fighting against Israel. Hezbollah, from their territories in southern Lebanon, have been firing missiles into Israel. The Houthis in Yemen have been attacking sea routes in the waters around their territory, ones that would reach the south Israeli port of Eilat, in an attempt to curb their supplies. Whether their Iranian backers incited them or if they all did this of their own accord is up for debate, but the results are the same. Israel brought their might down upon their adversaries.As an outsider looking in, it may seem futile to repeat the same actions as those who came before, when the results are always the same. Maybe they believe it will be different with them or maybe they simply have no choice. There is a constant struggle between the Israeli people and the Palestinian people. However, there is no change without action. The Palestinian people believe that they cannot continue without doing something. The deadlock must be broken.
Despite this drive, armed struggle has only proven, time and again, to be ineffective. The only area which it succeeds is bringing their cause to the attention of the globe. This never lasts in the long run though. In the end, nothing changes. There are only two options left: to drop the idea of armed struggle, perhaps taking the diplomatic route as Fatah has, or find a solution with Israel to put an end to things once and for all. Hamas has already shown signs of changing course. They have held talks periodically with Fatah since July, with the latest being in Cairo in October 2024, hoping to resolve their differences. When the US general election results announced Donald Trump as the victor, Hamas quickly sent out a statement saying that they were “ready for a ceasefire.”
Proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah are in a standoff with Israel over the Palestinian issue, but it’s clear that their current methods are unsuccessful. Like the BSO and other proxies before them, Israel is pushing these organizations into existential crises. History may repeat itself and we will see this endless cycle repeat once more.
[Will Sherriff edited this piece.]
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.